The visit made by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Egypt in mid-February [Feb 14-ed] lived up to expectations and produced positive results. The visit was aimed at restoring relations between Cairo and Ankara. The aim was to bring them back to the level they were at ten years ago. After the talks, the two parties signed a joint declaration that included provisions for restructuring the high-level Strategic Cooperation Council and strengthening trade and security cooperation. During the meeting, the sides also discussed cooperation in the fields of energy, tourism, culture and education. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi expressed his desire for the opening of a new chapter in the relations between the two countries and the enrichment of their relations.

The background of the high-level visit

This high-level visit was especially significant given the current challenges faced by both countries. Conflicts and competition in the international system, such as the Western-led war in Ukraine against Russia and the growing rivalry between the United States and China, as well as the regional rivalry for influence in the Middle East between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Israel, create the need for close cooperation between the two countries.

The conflict in Gaza also complicates regional interactions, such as the Saudi-Israel normalization of relations under a trilateral agreement involving the United States. Under these circumstances, it is important for Erdogan to coordinate with Egypt to strengthen Turkey’s influential role in these interactions and maintain the image of a regional power. Egypt and Turkey want to increase their regional influence and play a significant role in international decision-making, whether in Western capitals, Moscow, Beijing, or New Delhi.

This visit strengthens both countries’ regional influence and allows them to continue playing an active role in the international arena. In a complex geopolitical environment, it also stresses the importance of cooperation and dialogue. This regional and global rivalry sometimes overlooks the economic interests of both Egypt and Turkey. For example, when the US proposed a land route between India and Europe via the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Israel, it “forgot” Ankara and Cairo.

The Gaza war has also complicated regional interactions, such as the normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations under the Saudi-Israeli-US trilateral agreement. According to Western diplomats, the proposal would have ensured Saudi Arabia’s security, a smooth transition of power from an ageing king to a crown prince, and future US promises of a Palestinian state as an alternative to a peace deal.

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, we have witnessed a weakening of the relative power of the United States and a lack of confidence in the political and economic foundations claimed by the Western liberal order. This had several manifestations, including the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001, the disgraceful failure of the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Western world’s abandonment of free-market principles during the global economic crisis of 2008, the failure of the US- and Western-backed Arab Spring revolutions, and Russia’s reaction to NATO’s expansion up to its borders. And this at a time when the rest of the world remains detached from this Western-Russian confrontation, which could lead to an exchange of nuclear strikes or a protracted war of attrition, as NATO constantly threatens Moscow and for which this aggressive bloc is intensively preparing itself.

Regional peace and tranquillity – political outcome of the visit

The Gaza war has reached a critical point with an impending Israeli offensive on the town of Rafah, along the Gaza Strip’s border with Egypt, where some 1.4 million people – more than half the territory’s population – are crammed into tent camps and overflowing apartments and shelters. During a press conference with El-Sisi, Erdogan urged Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to avoid a ground offensive in Rafah and accused the Israeli government of committing “massacres” in Gaza. “Efforts to depopulate Gaza are unacceptable,” he said. Egypt fears that a ground assault on Rafah would push hundreds of thousands of displaced Palestinians across the border into Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. It has threatened to suspend the country’s decades-old peace treaty with Israel.

President El-Sisi stated that he agreed with the Turkish President to strengthen consultation between the two countries on the Libyan file in a way that helps hold presidential and legislative elections and unify the military establishment in the country. “Our success would contribute to achieving security and political stability in Libya and serve as a model for resolving other disputes,” the Egyptian leader said.

Both Egypt and Turkey are unlikely to give up their Libyan allies, their fair share of Libyan resources, and their relative weight in the formation of the new government. Nor does Egypt need to change its position by rejecting the agreements reached by the governments of Fayez al-Sarraj and Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh with Turkey regarding maritime borders or Turkey’s exploitation of Libyan oil and gas fields.

An agreement can be reached with Ankara to facilitate a political solution for Libya, enabling the Libyan parties to form a new government that takes into account the interests of Egypt and Turkey. Furthermore, the agreements signed during Erdogan’s visit demonstrate that Turkish and Egyptian companies can collaborate on projects in both Eastern and Western Libya on an equal footing. This collaboration will provide political support for Libya and funding for the projects.

Regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Turkey is Ethiopia’s second-largest investor after China, with more than 200 Turkish companies operating in the country. The Ethiopian government also received military aid from Turkey, which assisted in their victory in the recent civil war. Thus, Turkey could potentially assist in persuading the Ethiopian government to reach a compromise with Egypt regarding the GERD issue. Egypt could use its alliances with Greece and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean to facilitate a process that would allow Turkey to access a share of gas in the waters separating it from those countries without getting into legal disputes over agreements that have been in place for more than a century.

Turkey’s military and economic capabilities undoubtedly make it a significant regional power in the Middle East. It can pursue independent policies as long as they do not conflict with the vital interests of major international centers. Turkish military exports, especially unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and guided missiles have become an important instrument of this influence, particularly in shaping military confrontations in Turkey’s favour in Libya, Syria, Azerbaijan, and Ethiopia.

Countries in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria and Morocco, are eager to acquire these advanced and much-needed UAVs. Qatar has even purchased a Turkish factory to produce tanks designed with Turkey’s expertise in regional warfare. Turkey’s foreign minister recently announced his country’s intention to supply Egypt with drones and drone technology as part of military cooperation projects that were also discussed during Erdogan’s visit.

Egypt’s forthcoming interests and benefits

With the transition from unipolar US dominance in the international system, the role and influence of major regional powers, including Turkey, has become increasingly important and significant in many regional issues. Turkey has strategically invested in both economic and military initiatives in several conflict-ridden regions, including Libya, Ethiopia, and Syria. These regions are of particular relevance to Egypt. The US and several European nations are working to encourage political compromise between eastern and western Libyan factions in order to gain control over the country’s oil and gas resources. Turkish and Egyptian officials expressed their willingness to reach an understanding and compromise on Libya, given their significant interests in the country.

At the bilateral level, Turkey may renew its billion-dollar credit line to finance Turkish exports and projects in Egypt. The agreement was signed in 2013, but Egypt did not benefit from it because it was concluded shortly before former President Mohamed Morsi was removed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Agreements were reached on Turkish investments in Egypt for solid household waste processing, specifically slum clearance. In May 2013, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi (then defense minister) and Erdogan signed another frozen agreement for a $200 million loan to finance Egypt’s purchase of Turkish weapons and joint military production projects. Such agreements may be revised to finance projects such as importing and producing Turkish drones, torpedo boats, vehicles, and electric cars in Egypt.

According to Adel El Lamei, Chairman of Egyptian side of Egypt-Turkey Business Council, the two countries are discussing trade exchange in local currencies. Turkish investments in Egypt amounted to more than $2.5 billion by April 2023, Egyptian Minister of Trade and Industry Ahmed Samir Saleh said in a statement on Tuesday. The trade exchange between the two countries reached $5.875 billion in 2023, with Egypt’s exports to Turkey increasing by 28 per cent to $2.9 billion compared to 2022. According to the Egyptian Minister of Industry and Trade, in 2023 Turkey became one of the largest importers of Egyptian goods and Egypt’s main trading partner.

Huge business opportunities

Egypt could potentially benefit from the expertise of Turkish businessmen in the textile industry to boost its exports and address the issues faced by Egyptian textile factories owned by the public sector. Turkish manufacturers in Egypt are taking advantage of cheap gas and labour to sell their products in the large Egyptian market, as well as in the US, African, and Arab markets where Egypt enjoys significant customs benefits. This presents a profitable model for foreign investment in Egypt.

Over the past two years, the value of Egyptian liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to Turkey has exceeded $2 billion, contributing to a total of $5 billion in Egyptian exports to Turkey last year. This is equivalent to Egypt’s imports from Turkey, bringing the total trade balance between the two countries to 10 billion dollars. In 2011, the Arab Gas Pipeline, which extends from Egypt to Jordan, Israel, and Syria, stopped approximately 100 kilometers short of the Turkish territory. The two countries are preparing to use the line to supply Egyptian gas to Lebanon. They are considering using it in both directions, which opens up the possibility of connecting to the Turkish network. The Turkish network will carry large volumes of Russian gas over the next few years.

Clearly, the opportunities for joint cooperation between the two countries at the regional and bilateral levels far outweigh the areas of rivalry or potential conflict between them. The outcome of Erdogan’s visit to Egypt speaks for itself. Both Egyptian and Turkish media have viewed the visit as the start of a new phase of close relations between the two countries, based on shared interests and lessons learned from past mistakes.

Victor Mikhin, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, specially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2024/03/01/egypt-turkey-a-very-positive-visit-by-president-erdogan/