I then spoke with F for some considerable time who again voiced his concerns for the safety of the person who examined the bodies.... in this regard, for that persons protection we will obtain details for our own files on this review. All communications are thus duplicated and distributed to other third parties within the UK and overseas for our own protection. Certain Political figures have also been notified and media outlets, in the event of persons coming to harm.

----------

--- On Tue, 19/4/11,

Alexander.Passa@scotlandoffice.gsi.gov.uk <Alexander.Passa@scotlandoffice.gsi.gov.uk> wrote:

For the attention of the Mull of Kintyre Review Board

From: Alexander.Passa@scotlandoffice.gsi.gov.uk

<Alexander.Passa@scotlandoffice.gsi.gov.uk>
Subject: RE: Chinook Part 2

To: peter.eyre

Cc: Ada.Munns@scotlandoffice.gsi.gov.uk

Date: Tuesday, 19 April, 2011, 9:21

Dear Mr Eyre,

Thank you for your email of 18 April 2011.

As Secretary to the Review I am responding on behalf of Lord Philip and his panel.

As you will no doubt be aware, the Mull of Kintyre Review’s stated policy is that any material or comment provided is done so in strict confidence. The Review will not comment on, or release any material prior to the Review’s publication. It would be wholly inappropriate to enter into any correspondence regarding any line of inquiry the Review is taking or with whom the panel has spoken.

Regards

Alex Passa

Secretary to the Mull of Kintyre Review

1 Melville Crescent

Edinburgh, EH3 7HW

www.mullofkintyrereview.org.uk/

-----

I would just like to point out to all those that were in power at the time of this tragedy and the positions they held.

John Major – Ex Prime Minister

Michael Heseltine – Ex President of the Board of Trade

Malcolm Rifkind – Secretary of State for Defence

*

On Saturday 28 May 2011, I went over many aspects of the crash. Some remarkable information shows that this was truly a cover up with false statements being made by a Northern Ireland politician and some other strange events within Northern Ireland’s Airspace, Scottish Airspace and at the scene of the accident.

First I would like to make note of the following exchange between William Ross, former East Londonderry MP, and Mr. John Speller, MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence who put down a series of questions in 2001 as follows:

15 Feb 2001: Column: 191W

Written Answers to Questions

Thursday 15 February 2001

Mr. William Ross: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many Chinook helicopters were flown (a) into and (b) out of Northern Ireland on 2 June 1994; and what their flight times and routes were. [150410]

Mr. Spellar [holding answer 14 February 2001]: No Chinook helicopters flew into Northern Ireland on 2 June 1994. One flew out, that being Chinook ZD576 which left RAF Aldergrove at 17.42 hours, en route to Fort George.

Mr. William Ross: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence for how long tasking records of helicopter flights are normally retained; in what form they are stored; how long they are retained in the case of an accident; and if the tasking records of the last flight of helicopter ZD576 have been retained. [150409]

Mr. Spellar [holding answer 14 February 2001]: Tasking forms recording helicopter flights in Northern Ireland are retained for six years. However in the case of an accident the relevant tasking record for the day it occurred will normally be held as part of the Board of Inquiry papers, for as long as it is necessary to retain the latter. The 2 June 1994 tasking record for Chinook ZD576 is still retained with the RAF Board of Inquiry report.

Mr. William Ross: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many and which Chinook helicopters were stationed in Northern Ireland in the months of May and June 1994; and from which bases they operated. [150403]

Mr. Spellar [holding answer 14 February 2001]: At that time two Chinook helicopters were detached to Northern Ireland. In May 1994 these were Mk1s until 15 Feb 2001: Column: 195W. 31 May when ZD576, the first Chinook Mk2 to operate in Northern Ireland, was delivered to RAF Aldergrove, and one of the Mk1s was flown back to RAF Odiham. All the Chinook aircraft in Northern Ireland operate out of RAF Aldergrove and return there at the end of the day’s tasking.

Mr. William Ross: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when it was decided, and by whom, that Chinook helicopter ZD576 would be used on the flight on which it crashed on 2 June 1994. [150411]

Mr. Spellar [holding answer 14 February 2001]: The flight was tasked by the Joint Air Tasking Operations Centre (JATOC) in Northern Ireland on 1 June 1994.

I would like to place emphasis on the response by Mr Spellar that no Chinooks flew into Northern Ireland on the 2nd of June 1994 and only one left which was Chinook ZD576 which departed at 1742 local time to its first position report (Waypoint A off the Mull of Kintyre Lighthouse) [emphasis added]

This statement is grossly incorrect based on the fact that another unidentified Chinook (believed to be American) appeared to come from the Aldergrove direction and flew out to sea just before the departure of ZD576; one can only assume this was based temporarily at RAF Machrihanish [emphasis added]

One 1 June 1994 Chinook ZD576 was flown by Lt (RN) Kingston, and upon return later that afternoon Lt (RN) Kingston discussed the following day’s tasking with Fl Lt Tapper. That tasking involved the movement of troops within Northern Ireland for which 6.5 hours had been allocated, the final task being the passenger flight from RAF Aldergrove to Fort George and return, to which 3 hours had been allocated. Fl Lt Tapper elected to carry out all this tasking using his own crew and consequently carried out flight planning for the Inverness flight during the evening of 1 June 1994. Fl Lt Tapper was seen preparing maps for the following day. MALM Forbes who was in another accommodation was also seen preparing maps for the next day. This aspect clearly shows the professionalism of both aircrews in preparing for the next day’s tasking. 

On 2 June 1994, Fl Lt Tapper conducted a sortie brief with his crew. Weather data was received with Machrihanish (situated just north of their first waypoint A) being borderline. The appropriate 230 Squadron Duty Officer was not available for the brief as he was at another brief involving a Puma formation, so Fl Lt Tapper left photocopies of his maps with the Duty Officers Assistant.

The passengers for this aircraft were processed through RAF Aldergrove Air Movement Section and received a safety briefing by two RAF staff (FS Holmes and Sgt Coles) who happened to be the crewmen belonging to Lt (RN) Kingston. The passengers were provided with appropriate safety equipment but their baggage was not x-rayed.

Fl Lt Tapper and crew were driven to Chinook ZD576 at approximately 1700 hours. At 1720 the passengers were boarded and their baggage secured along the centre of the cabin floor. The Chinook, callsign F4J40, took off at 1742 hours and departed on track 027 (M) ...comms was established on HF with 81SU (Strike Command) at 1746 and asked for a listening watch to be maintained. The aircraft requested to leave the Aldergrove Approach Radar frequency just before the Control Zone Boundary and concluded its ATC service with Belfast International Airport at 1747. The aircraft was not observed on radar after that time.

The aircraft was observed by several witnesses low level over the Antrim Hills heading toward the coastal point of Carnlough. At 1755 Scottish Military received a single call on their contact frequency and this call was not answered. After further investigation by myself the actual broadcast read as follows: “Scottish Military, good afternoon this is F4J40”

This is typical of calls made when entering another zone; it would have been answered by an acknowledgement and followed by any further instructions from ATC. But it was not answered and one can only assume that the crew would have called again to establish communications as it was getting close to their position report (Waypoint A). What is extremely strange is that from this moment on, there was a time lapse of approximately 4.5 minutes prior to impact and no further calls were made even though the report says that the helicopter was operating normally and was under full control. This information is critical in the investigation because this crew would have kept trying to contact Scottish Military as they were now flying in their zone with no communications to the controlling authority. Fl Lt Tapper would have kept making calls and in the event that communications were not established he would have gone back to Northern Ireland Control (his last controlling authority) to advise them that he has no comms with Scottish Military and they would then have told him to remain on this frequency whilst they check it out. A call to Scottish would then have been made to determine the problem etc.

Let’s recall the questions and answers between Mr William Ross and Mr Spellar when the latter said there was only one outbound movement of a Chinook that day – that no Chinooks came in and only one left which was the one that left for Scotland ZD576. Another mistake in this inquiry is the fact that a second Chinook was observed flying from the direction of Aldergrove heading up towards Portrush by a reliable witness; some witnesses in Bushmills (further to the east) heard the Chinook but did not see it.

Here is an account of that witness:

“My late parents and I were driving east from Coleraine towards Bushmills about 30 minutes before the crash. It had been a very wet afternoon and the sky was still very dark for the time of day. A Chinook with a [three colour] patchwork quilt style camouflage flew across our path just after we reached the top of Kilgrain hill. It was flying low in a northerly direction along the line of the Ballyversal road and by the time we reached the junction with that road the Chinook was just skimming the high ground to our left. There have been unconfirmed reports that the distinctive sound of a Chinook was heard over Bushmills.

No one has been able, so far, to explain the ownership of this Chinook or its role that day. I checked out the camouflage with someone who worked in the paint shop at RAF Odiham and he explained that this style of camouflage would most likely have been used by a special operations Chinook.” He added that the sun was breaking through the cloud to the west and was on the side of the Chinook and he was not sure if it was RAF or American as he was aware of US Navy seals operating from RAF Machrihanish around that time. One witness who was sailing offshore the Mull of Kintyre also mentioned the sun breaking through the cloud and he could see the reflection on the glass cockpit as it approached - obviously this was ZD576.

To give strength to this story I will also print the following from another report which clearly indicates another radar contact was made that remained unidentified:

-        There is taped data from a Scottish air traffic control room that shows an unidentified target nearing the Mull of Kintyre at precisely the same time as the disaster. And finally, we have been told by RAF sources that a United States Air Force team reached the crash site prior to any UK rescue unit and sifted through the wreckage. What were they looking for? 

Someone in Northern Ireland confirmed the same story in that when RAF staff arrived at the scene, there were other people sifting through the wreckage. One of the RAF crew approached them and asked what they were doing: the reply came in a strong American accent “We are looking for something that belongs to us.”

Two senior RAF officers at a base in Lincolnshire, one a senior communications officer, have confirmed that Americans were at the scene of the crash first. When the British servicemen asked them to explain themselves, they were told: “We are looking for something that belongs to us.” So to recap my main questions/concerns:

-        Why did Mr. Spellar give a false reply to Mr William Ross regarding the outbound movements that day?

-        Why was this second Chinook not identified as being within the Northern Ireland Zone and later the Scottish Zone?

-        Why didn”t Scottish Military make this additional radar contact information available to the first inquiry and why hasn’t the current review team received this information?

-        Why didn't the first inquiry board pick up the fact that almost 5 minutes had elapsed at a critical handover point, which meant that ZD576 was in a no comms situation? This would never happen in normal circumstances and Scottish would know their flight plan and Northern Ireland would have handed the Chinook over to them. Scottish would have called them to establish communications and likewise Fl Lt Tapper would have kept calling them.

-        As the report said, the crew and aircraft were operating normally up until nearing Waypoint Alpha; ZD576 had established HF comms with the RAF Strike Command and requested a listening watch be maintained. How come this additional back up frequency was not used by the crew? Could the crew have been incapacitated and did not make any calls at all?

-        Why was such a high profile flight undertaken without meticulous monitoring by the RAF and why were all the VIPs allowed to travel in one helicopter?

I am led to believe that two RAF Puma Helicopters were requested and refused, and that the crew was extremely apprehensive in having to fly ZD576.

I would be bold enough to state the possible events that took place that day:

-        Another Chinook (possibly US) with its own team onboard set out ahead of ZD576 and tracked up towards Portrush and then over to the Mull of Kintyre to monitor the flight of ZD576 and the actual crash (as reported, a second radar return was observed at the same time).

-        This helicopter carried the team that would go through the wreckage immediately after the crash and ahead of the RAF team. The only way this could occur was that the US team knew of the intended crash and was nearby ready to move in.  

-        This US team had no authority to enter the scene of a crash, especially when this involved an RAF aircraft with British crew and passengers. Air crash scenes become a sterile/secured area by the local police until such time as crash/emergency crews arrive and then after the investigation team takes over. Nothing is allowed to be taken from the scene prior to this and no third parties are allowed to enter. I would like to put on record that baggage and personal belongings were also removed, which is also in violation of normal protocol.

-        The statement made by the senior officer from Strathclyde Police just after the crash that there was nothing suspicious about it crash it was simply a very tragic accident alone made me deeply suspicious that this was a total cover-up as he does not have the experience or capacity to make such a statement, especially before the investigation got underway.

*

Further investigations into tragic incident suggest that the government had tried to pay off the relatives of the victims. Some interesting information indicated some sort of possible collusion between the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the British Intelligence Service as well as some possible activity by the IRA etc. It was well known that the US were applying lots of pressure on our government to resolve this rather long conflict, and it was broadly known that certain groups within the US were financially supporting the IRA.

So let’s look into the claim that some, if not all, of the relatives have received damages in out of court settlements; if so, why?

My first findings were from The Lawyer Publication as follows:

Litigation Writs 24/09/96

Four women whose husbands were killed almost two years ago in an air crash near the Mull of Kintyre in Scotland are suing the Ministry of Defence for compensation. Claims have been mounted by Elizabeth Biles, widow of Christopher Biles, of Shaftesbury, Dorset; Beverley Hornby, widow of Anthony Hornby, of Bloxworth, Dorset; Delyth Gregory-Smith, widow of Richard Gregory-Smith, of Guildford; and Jill Allen, widow of Richard Allen, of East Hagbourne, Didcot, Oxfordshire. Writs issued by Leigh Day and Co, London WC1.

I then came across an intelligence report N. 63 New Series, dated 30 June 1997: 

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has paid almost £8 million in compensation to the relatives of 17 top intelligence officers killed in the Chinook helicopter crash in Scotland, in June 1994.  The information was revealed after Delyth Gregory-Smith, the widow of an Army intelligence officer, accepted an undisclosed out-of-court settlement (believed to be in excess of £500,000) on 16 June. Twelve of the 29 claims against the MoD have still to be settled. If the present rate of compensation is maintained, payments will eventually exceed £14 million. The twin-engined, recently-modified Chinook Mk2, with 25 passengers and four Royal Air Force (RAF) crew, had been travelling from RAF Aldergrove, in Belfast, to a weekend conference of intelligence and anti-terrorist experts at Fort George, in Inverness, according to the MoD, when it failed to clear the mist-covered, 240- meter high Torr Mor on the Mull of Kintyre.

Ten Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) Special Branch members, nine senior Army intelligence officers and six MI5 agents attached to the Northern Ireland Officer, as well as the four RAF crew, died in the crash. An MoD/RAF board of inquiry blamed the crash on the “gross negligence” of the pilot Flight Lieutenant Johanthan Tapper, and his copilot, Flt. Lt. Richard Cook. 

Mrs. Gregory-Smith sued the MoD claiming the helicopter had been flying too low in poor visibility and had ascended to rapidly in an attempt to clear the rocky outcrop when the crash happened. The Chinook had been fitted with a computerized automatic pilot, called a Mission Management System, which, using a set of vectors and other flight data, allows pilots to sit back and fly by computer.

Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Gregory-Smith, of the Army Intelligence Corps based at Army Headquarters, in Lurgan, County Armagh, could have expected to reach the rank of full colonel by January 1996, and eventually brigadier. He was posthumously awarded the Queen's Commendation for his covert work in Northern Ireland. The agreement on compensation for loss of earnings and bereavement was reached as the case was about to be heard by the High Court in London. The MoD had not contested the claim, but had failed to reach agreement on the amount of damages. Later an MoD official, Ian Burnett, said his department was satisfied with the outcome, especially as Mrs. Gregory-Smith had not been required to take the witness stand. 

That basically was the end of the brief, and naturally the settlement also meant that no MoD officials were called to give evidence or face cross-examination and, as a result, the cause of the Chinook crash still has not been properly explained. Looking at the information I have since received re the cause of death and additional information obtained from people in Northern Ireland, it is very clear the MoD had something to cover up and had to address urgently urgency.

Till recently, the MoD and RAF maintained the crash was pilot error; then why would they pay out damages to all the relatives when MoD/RAF were not responsible for the accident? One should add that Boeing have said little about this accident and that evidence to date indicates this was no accident nor caused by in-flight failure. All concerned said that until arrival at Waypoint Alpha, the crew had full control of the aircraft and everything appeared to be operating normally.

I have serious doubts this was in fact the case, as previously cited evidence suggests the crew may have been totally disabled prior to this turning point and may have been dead. If so, the Chinook would have continued on its existing heading (on auto pilot) and ploughed into the high ground.

But until Ms Andrea Davison is called for questioning it would be impossible to proceed further on this new review. There are some very grey areas regarding what was a second Chinook doing in the general area; what was the status regarding a second radar contact in the vicinity at the time; why there was total failure to maintain communications with the Chinook and why 25 high profile passengers were loaded onto one helicopter.

Looking at the intelligence side in Northern Ireland, it has long been talked about that British Intelligence were deeply involved with formal bodies in Northern Ireland and with some key individuals. This relationship reportedly covered both the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). MI5 were deeply embedded in the embassy in Dublin and Jack Phoenix who died on the Chinook played an unusual role in the conflict.

During the Northern Ireland conflict there was lots of activity by special forces that involved US Navy Seals - Royal Navy - Green Berets and the SAS, monitored closely by the CIA and MI5. One ex-SAS man revealed that they were ordered to carry out despicable, cowardly acts, killing 40 people. Stirring up trouble was the key to keeping security forces in Northern Ireland and lessening the likelihood of peace or a United Ireland breaking out. Often these clandestine operations would take out the wrong guy. 

One SAS man said there was a policy of shoot-to-kill and he believed his instructions were not coming from the SAS High Command and that MI5 ran the entire murder programme. So we come back to these black operations and ask - who was involved in the shooting of the passengers and crew of Chinook ZD576 and what role did the other Chinook play in this event?

From the little snippets of information that come my way from people who were directly or indirectly aware of the happenings that tragic day, 2 June 1994, I find it distressing that relatives of the deceased would accept money from MoD/RAF rather than pursue justice for their loved ones who died at the hands of an assassination group. Were they US Navy Seals? It is certainly suspicious that when the RAF crews arrived at the scene the crash site was overrun by Americans. We may never know how this was pulled off but the clue has to be the second Chinook and the testimony of Ms Tara Andrea Davison….

Peter Eyre, a former British Naval officer, worked at NATO headquarters, and spent a lot of time in the Middle East and South East Asia as a petroleum consultant; he lives in the UK and writes regularly for the Palestine Telegraph; his website is www.eyreinternational.com