Turkey and the European Security Architecture
by Alexandr Svaranc on 26 Mar 2025 0 Comment

A united Europe is focused on forming a continental military organisation. But where does Turkey stand?

 

Turkey is striving to become a participant in the new European security architecture

 

Internal contradictions within NATO between the United States and the European Union place Turkey, the alliance’s sole Muslim member, in a challenging position. Since the era of the “sick man of Europe” (i.e., the 19th century), the Ottoman Empire and later the Republic of Turkey have linked their strategic security to a strong Western alliance against Russia and Asia. Over time, Turkey has been compelled to change its principal military ally within the West multiple times (between Britain, Germany, and the United States), depending on which of these nations assumed leadership of the Western world at a given historical stage.

 

Former Turkish Foreign Minister and ex-Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, referring to the doctrine of Neo-Ottomanism (of which he is the principal architect), noted that just as there was no united Europe during the Ottoman era, there is none today for modern Turkey. “There exists only a strong tradition of European diplomacy, which is always reinforced by powerful national strategies with the potential to lay the groundwork for and pave the way towards international conflicts and clashes of interests in Europe.” Ahmet Davutoglu. Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararasi Konumu. Istanbul. Kure, 2001. S. 536.

 

Accordingly, Ankara will take into account the existing contradictions between all key players in the Western community when formulating its security strategy.

 

Turkey’s approach to defence allocations and the military-industrial sector fundamentally differs from that of its European allies. President Erdogan has systematically strengthened the nearly one-million-strong Turkish army, increased funding for the defence industry, and positioned Turkish military products (drones, armoured vehicles, firearms, artillery systems, etc.) on global markets. Turkey also finances military deals with the United States but, unfortunately, faces sanctions due to its partnership with Russia.

 

Arguments and contradictions on Turkey’s path to a European NATO

 

Ankara understands that Turkey’s advantageous geopolitical position and its unfulfilled ambitions within the framework of the Pan-Turanian doctrine – hypothetically creating a “sanitary corridor” between Russia on one side and Iran and China on the other – are of great interest to the Anglo-Saxon world (primarily the United Kingdom and the United States).

 

However, Turkey is also aware that its regional ambitions in the Middle East raise concerns for the United States and Israel. In Syria, the pro-Turkish regime led by Ahmed al-Sharaa may find itself under attack from Israel and Syrian insurgents (including Assad loyalists, Kurds, Druze, and other opponents of Turkey). Ankara has pledged support to the new transitional government in Damascus for establishing a 300,000-strong army, while the Turkish military is urgently advancing into northern Syria to repel opposition fighters challenging the regime.

 

All of this could create additional complications in Turkey’s strategic security architecture and pose new threats to the unity of the Turkish state (including the potential for exacerbating Turkish-American relations and the military alliance due to President Trump’s commitment to a strategic partnership with Israel). The list of Turkish-American contradictions is further compounded by the issue of post-war Gaza, where the United States and Israel seek to displace local Palestinians.

 

Beyond Turkish-American tensions, there remain numerous historical, political, and economic discrepancies between Turkey and continental Europe. Turkey lacks strategic deterrence weapons and is forced to rely on the protection of nuclear powers. However, within continental Europe, Turkey’s conflicts are not limited to its neighbour Greece but also extend to nuclear-armed France (with contentious issues spanning Africa, the Mediterranean, Cyprus, Greece, Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Syria). Turkey’s closest ally, Azerbaijan, continues to criticise France sharply. Consequently, Turkey will need to de-escalate its disagreements with France to secure a “ticket” into a European NATO.

 

Despite being denied EU membership, Turkey’s logistical role in transporting Asian goods to the European market has grown exponentially over the past few decades. Ankara is attempting to act as a bridge between Turkic nations and the EU.

 

Turkey possesses NATO’s second-largest army (after the United States) but not the most combat-ready one. This is largely because, after the First World War, Turkey did not participate in major military conflicts. The naval operation to occupy northern Cyprus in 1974, along with the involvement of limited Turkish military and special forces in “local wars” in Yugoslavia, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Syria, is insufficient experience for conducting large-scale military operations. However, it is fair to note that European armies have not particularly distinguished themselves in victorious wars anywhere since the Second World War either.

 

Ankara cannot remain indifferent to the rift within NATO and the formation of a European military organisation. Turkey, as in the past, sees its future tied to integration with the EU and is a member of the European Customs Union. The European market remains a priority for Ankara in terms of economic development and strengthening its position in Asia (whether within the Turkic world or the Middle East). This is precisely why Turkey closely monitors EU-US relations, and President Erdogan has held targeted negotiations with his French counterpart, Emmanuel Macron.

 

Turkey supports the formation of a new European security architecture and expresses its readiness to take an active role in its development. Erdogan believes that without Turkey (its million-strong army, defence industry, and intelligence), Europe (the EU) will not be able to ensure the continent’s full security. Following the London summit, Erdogan stated: “It is unthinkable to establish European security without Turkey.”

 

Turkey publicly supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations, continues to provide military aid to Kyiv, offers Istanbul as a venue for Russian-Ukrainian peace talks, and seeks to become a guarantor of Ukraine’s remaining statehood by deploying its peacekeepers. In turn, President Volodymyr Zelensky sees Turkey as part of a greater united Europe, whose army, in his view, should act as a guarantor of Ukraine’s security.

 

On one hand, Ankara is interested in weakening both Russia and Ukraine to establish its control over Crimea and strengthen its influence in the Black Sea region. On the other hand, Erdogan attempts to leverage the Ukrainian issue and the Western symphony of pro-Ukrainian sentiment to integrate Turkey into the new EU military organisation.

 

It is clear that Turkish-British relations remain strong, but what guarantees are there that Paris and Berlin will not establish a separate continental European military organisation independent of the Anglo-Saxons? Moreover, how should Turkey position itself when it seeks EU membership, while the United Kingdom has left the union? Ankara believes that Europe cannot ensure its security without Turkey and the United Kingdom.

 

Formally, Turkey may be excluded from the European military organisation on the grounds that it is an alliance of EU member states. However, Paris is unlikely to refuse Ankara’s participation in shaping the new security architecture of continental Europe, lest it create a new rival (or adversary) in Turkey. It is improbable that Turkey would abandon NATO in favour of, for instance, the CSTO, as Turkey has no desire to play second to Russia. Additionally, Turkey’s ambitions in the post-Soviet space will eventually lead to significant contradictions with Russia.

 

Turkey may initiate the creation of its own military bloc under the name “Army of Turan” (or an Asian NATO bureau) including all members of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS). Meanwhile, France and Germany remain interested in the economic markets and natural resources of Azerbaijan and other Turkic countries in Central Asia. Therefore, Turkey remains a key player in European security.

 

Alexander Svarants – Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2025/03/22/turkey-and-the-european-security-architecture/  

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