The situation in Jammu province started deteriorating with each passing day after June 28. But the complacent authorities, instead of keeping awake at night and taking some concrete measures to diffuse the potentially volatile situation in the region, allowed it to drift and drift. They took no cognizance of the developments in Jammu, including a complete 8-day-long shutdown from June 30 to July 7, massive protests and pitched battles between the protestors and the police. The authorities continued to entertain the belief that the people would soon give up the path of confrontation and resume their normal activities. This turned out to be a wrong impression, as the determined people continued their protests in one form or the other. They did not abandon the path of agitation even after the collapse of the Congress-led minority government and continued to promote their ideological cause and register their anger against the revocation of the land transfer order in their own way. Almost all these activities were outside the confines of the SAYSS. 

It was the ambivalent and directionless SAYSS which actually let down the people by suddenly calling off the strike on July 8. It called off the strike despite the fact that the authorities had not conceded its two fundamental demands – recall of Governor N.N. Vohra and restoration of the Baltal land to the SASB. The action of the SAYSS must have pleased the Governor, who on the same day met several delegations and a number of Kashmir-based political leaders, including JKPCC chief Saif-ud-Din Soz, and declared in Srinagar that restoring peace was his top priority (Kashmir Times, July 9, 2008). … …

Governor’s initiative

It was only after July 23 that the prospect of a prolonged agitation in Jammu over the land issue stirred the Governor and alarmed the authorities in New Delhi to an extent. The Governor sent his emissaries in the persons of the State Chief Secretary, S.S. Kapur; Commissioner / Secretary, Home Department, Anil Goswami; and Director General of Police, Kuldeep Khoda, to Jammu to persuade the local BJP leaders and the leadership of SAYSS to call off the strike, which commenced in the evening of July 23, when Kuldip Verma laid down his life for the Amarnath land. They met local BJP leaders as well as the leadership of the SAYSS both separately and collectively. But nothing came out of these meetings because the Governor’s emissaries had nothing to offer except the proposal of dialogue between them and the Governor. They went back to Srinagar empty-handed.

In the meantime, the authorities sought to create an impression that the Governor had extended an invitation to the SAYSS so that the land issue could be discussed and ways and means found to diffuse the situation, but the SAYSS had disapproved of the idea of a dialogue over the issue. The SAYSS reacted immediately and denied that it had received any communication from the Raj Bhawan to that effect...

It was on July 30 that the SAYSS received a specific and formal invitation for talks with the Governor, which it most cheerfully accepted. It was a sad climbdown from its stated position – “we will not hold talks with the Governor because it was he who became instrumental in the revocation of the land diversion order”. The convener of the samiti justified the climbdown by saying that “in response to written invitation sent by the Governor himself the leaders of the Sangharash Samiti have decided to reply to the offer of talks in writing highlighting our demands” and that not to accept the Governor’s invitation would be to send a wrong signal (The Pioneer, July 31, 2008). …

The process of dialogue started the following day i.e., July 31. A 6-member delegation led by the SAYSS’ spokesman, Tilak Raj Sharma, met the Governor at Raj Bhawan. The talks were bound to fail and it actually happened. After the meeting, which lasted for about 90 minutes, the samiti spokesperson said that the “government had nothing to offer” and that the delegation had submitted a letter to the Governor containing “our demands”. That the Governor had nothing in his kitty to offer anything concrete to the delegation was a foregone conclusion. He was interested more in ending the Jammu agitation than in meeting the demands of its people…

[The Governor] took recourse to a methodology which was calculated to pit certain Jammu-based political leaders and others against the SAYSS and ensure the collapse of the people’s movement. He convened an all-party meeting at Raj Bhawan on August 2 to discuss the prevailing situation in the Jammu province and find ways and means leading to the end of the over one-month-long agitation. After the meeting, which again continued for 90 minutes, leaders of various political parties issued a joint appeal and urged the people of Jammu to “maintain calm and help the administration restore normalcy in the larger national interest”…

It is very significant to note that most of the leaders, who participated in the meeting, were those whose parties had worked for the revocation of the land transfer order. And, they represented parties like the NC, the PDP, the CPI-M and the CPI… The local BJP leaders were conspicuous by their absence in the meeting. The Panun Kashmir leaders had also spurned the Governor’s invitation. … …

Finding himself in a difficult situation, the desperate Governor constituted a 4-member panel on August 6. It consisted of former Chief Secretary and advisor to the Governor S.S. Bloeria, retired High Court judge G.D. Sharma, Jammu University Vice-Chancellor Amitabh Mattoo and Principal Secretary to the Governor and Chief Executive Officer B.B. Vyas. S.S. Bloeria was the chairman of this panel. The stated objective of this panel was to “carry forward the process of dialogue and discussion so as to amicably resolve the fundamental issues in an acceptable manner” (Indian Express, August 7, 2008).

The constitution of this panel created a sort of commotion not only in the SAYSS, but also among the people of Jammu. The reason was the alleged attempt on the part of the authorities to create an impression that the Governor was very considerate and that he had constituted the panel as per the wishes of the SAYSS (Hindustan Times, August 9, 2008). A report to this effect in a section of print media had created an awkward situation for the SAYSS leadership and all the more because an impression had already gained ground that the samiti leadership wanted to conclude a truce over land at the earliest. Another factor, which had put a question mark on the sincerity and commitment of the SAYSS towards its demands, was its little or no emphasis on the demand relating to the Governor’s recall. The very credibility of the SAYSS leadership was at stake... …

Anyway, the panel remained virtually non-functional till August 23, when it held three rounds of talks with the SAYSS in Jammu. It might have used the intervening period for the behind-the-scene activities to rope in certain weak elements in the SAYSS and create an atmosphere that would help it make the SAYSS toe its line or accept its formula. Indeed, there were persons in the SAYSS who were in touch with Raj Bhawan and they belonged to the BJP. One of them was also in constant touch with Vice-Chancellor Amitabh Mattoo. It became evident during the meetings of the small core group. A particular senior BJP leader wanted the SAYSS to adopt a mild line, but could not muster courage to open up…   …     

Delhi’s intervention

Paradoxically, the Union Government, instead of dousing fire in Jammu, adopted the policy of wait and watch. The basic reason behind this approach was the belief that the people of Jammu would not be in a position to sustain the movement for more than a week. The belief had stemmed from the intelligence reports, as also from the Governor’s assessment (Dainik Jagran, August 6, 2008). The Prime Minister did hold a series of meetings in Delhi on July 3, but he took no concrete step to diffuse the situation in Jammu, despite the fact that it had a cascading effect in other parts of the country and that the BJP and other RSS outfits had by then raked up the issue across the nation in a big way. His main concern was, it appears, to ensure victory of the Congress-led government in the state on July 7, the day Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad was to prove his majority on the floor of the House (Kashmir Times, July 4, 2008).

Between July 3 and August 4, the Union Government did not do anything whatever. It continued to watch the developments in Jammu as a mute spectator for more than 30 days. In fact, it left everything to the care of Governor N.N. Vohra, the army, the paramilitary forces and the police overlooking the fact that they had miserably failed to control the situation in Jammu. It was only on August 4 that the Union Home Ministry, at the behest of the Prime Minister, sent a team to the state for an on-the-spot assessment of the situation. The team was consisted of the Home Secretary Madhukar Gupta; the Defence Secretary, Vijay Singh; and the Director General CRPF, V.K. Joshi. In Jammu, the team members met Principal Secretary, Home, Anil Goswami; Director General of Police, Kuldeep Khoda; GOC 26 Division, Major General D.L. Choudhary; Instector General of Police, Jammu range, K. Rajendra Kumar; and Divisional Commissioner, Jammu, Sudhanshu Pandey. … ….

The same day, while the AICC president, Sonia Gandhi talked to the BJP national president, Rajnath Singh, the Home Minister, Shivraj Patil, met Leader of the Opposition, L. K. Advani. Both of them sought the cooperation BJP leaders in restoring normalcy in Jammu. Shivraj Patil, in particular, told Advani that it would not be advisable to make political capital out of the land issue (Dainik Jagran, August 5, 2008). Manmohan Singh, along with the External Affairs Minister, also talked to L.K. Advani and asked him to help the Union Government restore normalcy in Jammu (Amar Ujala, August 6, 2008). …… The BJP was of the view that the Union Government was striving to push the basic issue of restoration of land to the SASB under carpet. The stand of the BJP was that the Union Government should talk directly to the SAYSS, that “some concrete measures are required to bring the situation back to normal” and that the prevailing situation was the immediate fall-out of the “government’s pandering” to the separatists (Kashmir Times, August 6, 2008).

First all-party meeting

… the Prime Minister decided to convene an all-party meeting at Delhi on August 6 to take stock of the prevailing situation in Jammu and discuss ways and means leading to the resolution of the issue…

The meeting, which continued for four hours, was a total flop, as it failed to arrive at an agreed solution to the land issue. There was also controversy over whether N.N. Vohra should be retained or removed. The BJP blamed the Union Government for all the troubles in Jammu and put forth three specific demands – remove Vohra, restore land to the SASB and initiate dialogue directly with the SAYSS (Amar Ujala, August 7, 2008)…  …

The immediate fall-out of the all-party meeting was the resignation of all the members of the Shrine Board on the same day. Sources in the Raj Bhawan claimed that the board members tendered resignations on their own to enable the Governor to reconstitute the SASB. But according to insiders, they had been asked by the Governor to resign. The move was actually calculated to divert the people’s attention away from the issue and create confusion among them by creating an impression that the Governor’s dispensation had started taking corrective measures. That was the reason the move did not evoke any favourable response either from the SAYSS or from the agitating people. In fact, the SAYSS declared that it was concerned with the main issue, and not with the constitution or the reconstitution of the SASB, which was a secondary matter (Ibid., August 7, 2008).

Second all-party meeting

The Prime Minister contemplated to organize one more all-party meeting in Delhi on August 12 with a view to discussing the report of the all-party delegation that visited the state on August 9 and 10...

However, one of the suggestions, which was endorsed by most members of the delegation, was that the State Government should go strictly by the Jammu and Kashmir High Court’s directives relating to the use of Baltal land by the SASB. Arun Jaitley gave this suggestion. “Stick to two things: The Shri Amarnath Shrine Board Act, a legislation passed by the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly in 2000, that led to the formation of Amarnath Shrine Board and the court directions interpreting its powers and functions regarding the Yatra… The rest – land transfer, its revocation and everything else – be treated as null and void” (Indian Express, August 11, 2008). …

The Union Government did convene second all-party meeting in Delhi on August 12. But the Prime Minister did not chair it. The meeting was presided over by Home Minister Shivraj Patil. The outcome of the meeting was on expected lines. The all-party meeting felt that it was imperative that all the groups concerned from Jammu and Kashmir should work for restoring peace and normalcy in the “sensitive border state” (The Times of India, August 13, 2008). The meeting also decided to invite the SAYSS leaders to Delhi for talks on the land issue. “The government will take steps to engage all the groups concerned from Jammu as well as the Kashmir Valley in talks so that the issues could be resolved to the satisfaction of all concerned”. Shivraj Patil, D. Raja, member of Rajya Sabha and CPI national secretary, and Ghulam Nabi Azad all sang the same song – “solution acceptable to the people of both Jammu and Kashmir regions”; “sentiments of the people of both Jammu and Kashmir regions would be respected while finding a solution to the Amarnath land row”.

However, it was the Union Home Minister who sprang a big surprise when he said: “There is no need to cause inconvenience to the fruit growers. But if trucks are going through Muzaffarabad route, Pakistan should allow the movement. In fact, we have also written to Pakistan in this regard. If our goods get exported to other countries, why will we have a problem” (Daily Excelsior, August 13, 2008). He was the same Home Minister who had opposed the Muzaffarabad Chalo call just two days ago in Srinagar itself. …

Union Government’s actions between August 14 and 31

After the second all-party meeting, the Union Government adopted a new strategy to tackle the situation in Jammu. At the same time, it took no step whatever to take on board the SAYSS. In fact, it left this task to the care of Governor N.N. Vohra. It was a complete U-turn. It had held out an assurance twice that it would enter into a dialogue with the SAYSS, but it did not keep its word. On the other hand, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh virtually censured the SAYSS and the BJP on August 15, saying that “in this hour of crisis, divisive politics will lead us nowhere…I appeal to all political parties to keep the long-term interests of Jammu and Kashmir and come together to find a permanent solution to the problem of the state”. He said so from the ramparts of Red Fort (Hindustan Times, August 16, 2008). … …

SAYSS’s shifting stance: Downgraded level of dialogue                  

… it was on August 23 that the 4-member panel started discussions with the representatives of the SAYSS. The SAYSS’ representatives were Brigadier Suchet Singh, Tilak Raj Sharma, Narinder Singh and Pawan Kohli. The agenda for talks included an arrangement for the use of 800 kanals of land at Baltal-Domail by the SASB, duration of the pilgrimage, assessment of the total requirement of land by the SASB and the existing availability at various locations, a mechanism for retaining overall responsibility for pilgrimage arrangements by the SASB and reconstitution of the SASB and the Board’s duties and powers. The panel had proposed this 5-point agenda for talks at the insistence of the SAYSS, which had made it loud and clear that it would not hold talks “unless the Governor’s panel comes (out) with a concrete proposal” (Indian Express, August 22, 2008).…

The first round of talks between the Governor’s panel and the SAYSS was held in a cordial atmosphere. Both the sides met each other for one and half hour, exchanged their proposals and dispersed. They met again at 2 pm. The second round of talks was not a smooth affair. What had created a sort of controversy was the official proposal that the SASB will be allowed to “use” the land in question at Baltal for three months – two months during the Yatra period and one month before its commencement. The SAYSS’ representatives refused to agree to the word “use”, saying “use of land didn’t mean anything to us”. They opposed the word “use” on the ground that the future dispensation might not allow the SASB to use the land in question. They categorically told the panel that they wanted the Governor’s dispensation to “issue an order diverting or transferring the land to SASB” on a permanent basis.

That all was not well became clear when the panel did not turn up for the third round of talks at the scheduled time i.e., 6 pm. It kept the representatives of the SAYSS waiting at Ved Mandir for three long hours. The third round of talks actually commenced after 9 pm, but nothing came out of the parleys...  …

There are reasons to believe that the causes responsible for the postponement of talks were deeper. One of the reasons was the eagerness of the authorities to take into confidence the separatists and “mainstream” Kashmiri leaders, particularly Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, whose party had adopted a very tough stand on the land issue. The authorities wanted to take on board the Kashmiri leadership before signing the agreement with the SAYSS. The meeting of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed with the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, the External Affairs Minister and the National Security Advisor at New Delhi on August 29, where he told them “a consensus over the resolution of this issue is important”, needs to be viewed in this context (Indian Express, August 30, 2008)... …

Behind-the-scene activities were going on simultaneously between the panel and the Governor. The issues were finally resolved when the panel agreed to accept the first and third demand and verbally assured the SAYSS that the Samba Senior Superintendent of Police will not only be transferred, but a judicial inquiry would also be instituted against him (Indian Express, August 31, 2008). Thereafter, both the parties signed the agreement. The most significant clause of the agreement was: “The State Government shall set aside for the use by the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board, exclusively, the land in Baltal and Domail (Compartment No. 63/S, Sindh Forest Division), comprising an area of 800 kanals, traditionally under the use for the yatra”, and free of cost. This was precisely what the people of Jammu fought for and wanted. The panel also accepted all other demands as contained in the SAYSS’ charter of demands. The State Government finally restored the Baltal land to the SASB on September 25, exactly 25 days after signing the agreement (Hindustan Times, September 26, 2008).              

It is significant to note that between July 23 and August 30 the ambivalent SAYSS’ leaders, particularly Leela Karan Sharma, went on shifting their stances...

It is important to note that during the first phase of the agitation in Jammu, the recall of Governor N.N. Vohra remained the foremost demand. As soon as the agitation generated pressures to force the Government of India to initiate dialogue with the SAYSS, the demand of recalling N.N. Vohra started assuming lesser importance for the RSS clique in the SAYSS. The Delhi-based leaders, including M. Venkaiah Naidu, were also in a mood to forgive N.N. Vohra for his role in returning the land to the State Government taking recourse to extra-constitutional and arbitrary methods. More intriguing perhaps was the fact that when the Union Government had almost decided to upgrade the dialogue process to the secretarial level of the Government of India, the SAYSS conceded to talk to a sub-committee created by none other than N.N. Vohra. This self-downgrading of the dialogue process by the SAYSS raised many questions.

… More plausible justification could be that N.N. Vohra was the choice of the BJP-led Union Government as an interlocutor on Jammu and Kashmir. He was an integral part of the peace initiative created and crafted by the NDA. His role in the state for implementing the solution model agreed upon by Pakistan and India was critical. His open support to the Wajahat Habibullah formula in the working group on Centre-state relations was crucial to set the ball rolling amongst the Hindus in Jammu to reconcile to the division of Jammu along river Chenab. The relief offered by the BJP and the Sangh Parivar had wider strategic objectives of pushing the give and take formula on Kashmir to a logical conclusion without having to pay for the averse fallout of such an eventuality.          

Excerpted from Chapter 6 of Conflicting Perceptions, by Prof. Hari Om, Yak Publishing Channel, Jammu, 2009 [Pages 417; Price: 975/-]

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